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Abstract The greatest rhetorical challenge to developers of creative artificial
intelligence systems is convincingly arguing that their software is more than just an
extension of their own creativity. This paper suggests that ‘‘creative autonomy,’’
which exists when a system not only evaluates creations on its own, but also
changes its standards without explicit direction, is a necessary condition for making
this argument. Rather than requiring that the system be hermetically sealed to avoid
perceptions of human influence, developing creative autonomy is argued to be more
plausible if the system is intimately embedded in a broader society of other creators
and critics. Ideas are presented for constructing systems that might be able to
achieve creative autonomy.
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The Quest for Creative Autonomy
Much of the theoretical work in creative artificial intelligence tries to specify when a
system has gone beyond simply doing the bidding of its programmer. For instance,
one rationale for Boden’s (1991) ‘‘transformational’’ criterion is that since the
programmer creates the initial search space with a particular view of what is
possible, a system that transformed that space would be going beyond the
programmer’s vision. Similarly, Ritchie’s (2007) ‘‘inspiring set’’ helps determine
whether an idea produced by the system was directly involved in the system’s
creation or training. Finally, Colton’s (2008) inclusion of imagination in his creative
tripod hearkens to the autotelic exploration of ideas that is not tethered to outside
forces.
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A computer program that relies on human judgments during the act of creation
can justifiably be seen as an extension of the operator’s creativity. To move a step
beyond, the judgments that the human operator contributes must be encoded or
learned so that the system can function independently. However, such a system
would be like an apprentice who slavishly adheres to the master’s creative
sensibilities. While such an apprentice may be creative at some basic level, fuller
creative achievement requires developing ideas about what is valuable or interesting
that move beyond the master’s standards. Thus, for creative artificial intelligence to
progress from a capable apprentice to a creator in its own right, it must be able to
both independently apply and independently change the standards it uses. This ideal
will be called ‘‘creative autonomy,’’ and represents the system’s freedom to pursue a
course independent of its programmer’s or operator’s intentions.
Once a program has started executing, any contact between the system and a
human operator can lead to justifiable questions about the system’s alleged
independence. One reaction might be to hermetically seal the system from the
outside world. However, human creativity takes place within a rich web of social
interactions (Csikszentmihalyi 1988; Sawyer 2007), a fact that does not call into
question any one person’s potential to be truly creative. In fact, it is in making sense
of and responding to interactions with other creators that we arrive at a style that is
unique to us, yet not so unusual that others will not take it seriously. Creative
autonomy will likewise be argued to emerge out of the interactions with multiple
critics and creators, not from solitary confinement.
Definition Creativity is a social construction, and thus cannot be reduced to
unassailable formal properties. Still, it is useful to suggest conditions under which a
system may more readily be seen as creative, so that they may be investigated
theoretically and empirically. Toward that end, a system will be said to have
creative autonomy if it meets the following three criteria:
Autonomous Evaluation—the system can evaluate its liking of a creation without
seeking opinions from an outside source
Autonomous Change—the system initiates and guides changes to its standards
without being explicitly directed when and how to do so
Non-Randomness—the system’s evaluations and standard changes are not purely
random
Autonomous evaluation requires that the system be able to issue opinions without
consulting an outside human or machine intelligence. However, the system is free to
ask for or observe others’ opinions at other times, and to store this information.
Autonomous evaluation could easily be achieved by using preprogrammed
standards or by learning another source’s standards, both of which could be used
to bootstrap a system. After this, however, autonomous change requires that the
system be able to independently change its standards. Though external events may
prompt and guide changes, the system cannot exclusively rely on another source to
tell it when to change standards, or when its new standards are acceptable, nor can it
simply make some fixed transformation to another source’s standards.
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An easy way to satisfy both criteria would be to issue random decisions, or to
make random criteria changes at random times. The non-randomness requirement is
meant to prevent this. Many algorithms incorporate randomness, so not all
randomness is precluded. For instance, the system could resolve conflicts between
standards randomly, or it could test random perturbations to its standards. Aside
from special cases like these, however, it cannot simply make random decisions. Of
course, this does not guarantee predictable outcomes.
Relationship to Other Concepts
Autonomy and Agency The term ‘‘autonomy’’ is often used in connection with
software agents, which Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) define as having autonomy
and social ability, and being able to act both reactively and proactively. There are
two broad kinds of autonomy that are discussed in relation to agents: executive
autonomy, and goal autonomy (Castelfranchi 1995). A system with executive
autonomy can choose how to achieve an externally-provided goal, while a system
with goal autonomy can also decide whether to accept that goal. Similarly, a system
capable of autonomous evaluation can apply externally-provided standards, while a
system capable of autonomous change can also decide how to change these
standards.
Though autonomous evaluation and change are analogous to executive and goal
autonomy, they are not the same. In particular, since creative autonomy refers only
to a system’s evaluation standards, it can apply to a critic (a system that can evaluate
creations, but that can’t itself create). Little is gained by speaking of this critic’s
goals, just as little is gained by speaking of a scale’s or a ruler’s goals (cf. Shoham
1993, p. 53). For systems that can create, it becomes meaningful to ascribe goals
(e.g., to create something it likes), but goal autonomy and autonomous change are
still separate. For instance, a creative system that produces music according to tastes
it arrived at independently is no less impressive if it cannot one day decide to deny
its operator’s request to compose a jovial melody.
Given this discussion, it is clear that a system with creative autonomy won’t
necessarily have the autonomy discussed by Wooldridge and Jennings. This makes
creative autonomy an orthogonal issue to agency. As a consequence, autonomously
creative systems can potentially retain the reactive nature of ordinary software.
Though it will be argued that achieving creative autonomy requires contact with
multiple outside intelligences, such contact is not part of the definition of creative
autonomy.
Creativity versus Creative Autonomy Creativity is evaluated both via what is
produced, and how it was produced (Kasof 1995). Creative autonomy may prove to
be a necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) condition for the ‘‘how’’, but does not
guarantee anything about the ‘‘what’’. A system with creative autonomy can be seen
as having the potential to do creative things, but it is a separate question whether it
ever will. Even if the system does do something creative, it could turn out that other
criteria will apply to the ‘‘how’’ (possibly including those in the definition of
‘‘agent’’) before the system itself can be considered to be creative. Still, creative
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autonomy is a useful concept and an important first step toward achieving machine
creativity.
Sources of Change
In highly formalized domains, it may be possible to hand code evaluation criteria. In
other cases, a system may do better to learn by example. In either case, criteria
changes must occur without explicit instruction from the programmer or expert. In
principle, these changes could occur endogenously (without input from outside the
system) or exogenously (based on input from outside the system), with separate
implications for creative autonomy.
Suppose that the system’s changes are entirely endogenous. For instance, it might
promote rules that lead to more efficient searches, or eliminate rules that lead to
contradictory conclusions. Though this system’s criteria would change in unpre-
dictable ways, they are still probabilistically ‘‘preordained,’’ in that the probability
distribution of outcomes is set before the program starts. What’s more, since a
field’s evaluation criteria change in light of new contributions (Sawyer 1999), the
system is in danger of growing obsolete, or of straying too far from other creators to
be taken seriously.1
As Castelfranchi (1995) observes, isolation is not a true form of autonomy. A
more palatable and realistic option is for the system to consider exogenous
information as it changes its criteria. They key question is how a system can
maintain this external connection without being slave to the information it receives.
The remainder of this paper considers how an externally attuned creative system
might achieve autonomous change without merely tracking changes in one or more
external authorities unconditionally. The sketched solution involves a set of
considerations that are orthogonal to evaluation criteria, but that have meaningful
connections to how human creators develop and change. The paper closes with a
discussion of implications and open questions.
Learning to Evaluate
This section describes how a creator could learn evaluation standards via its
interactions with others. Since both creators and non-creators have opinions, these
‘‘others’’ will be called ‘‘critics’’ rather than ‘‘creators’’. (All creators are critics, but
not all critics are creators.) The notation used below is based on Wiggins’ model of
creative search (Wiggins 2006). However, the only thing of interest here is how a
creator learns to judge the quality of finished products. How these standards affect
the search process, as well as how they apply to intermediate products, are left as
interesting questions for future work. This model assumes that there is at least one
critic, though its more interesting features do not apply unless there are more.
1 If the programmer considers the experiment to have failed and manually alters the system’s code or
knowledge, the new version should be considered an extension of the old, in which case autonomous
change was not achieved.
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Though the processes described here are inspired by human creativity, they could be
implemented in a society of solely AI creators, or in a mixed human-machine
society.
Subjectivity Assume that a creation’s value is at least in part socially constructed,
and that different critics have different standards. Wiggins uses E for the knowledge
representing these standards, which can be subscripted to indicate whose standards
are in question, e.g., Ei.2
In addition to knowing that people have different opinions, we can often estimate
a typical or specific person’s opinion (Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer 1995;
Fourquet-Courbet et al. 2008). Thus, the knowledge in Ei can be segmented by
whose evaluations the knowledge is about. For this we will use the subscript ij,
where i is the perceiver and j is whose opinion is perceived. A dot (‘‘’’) will
represent the typical critic. Thus,
Ei ¼ hEi; Ei1; . . .; Eii; . . .; EiNi
where N is the number of critics in the society. Knowing other critics’ preferences
lets a creator target an audience, and so it is important for the information to be
correct. Therefore, assume that creators continuously correct inaccuracies.
For sake of argument, assume that creators represent knowledge at the most
general level possible and avoid duplicating knowledge. This means that something
that applies to most creators would be stored in Ei, and creator j’s deviations from
this would be stored in Eij. If creator i knows nothing specific about creator j’s
standards, then Eij ¼ ;. We will assume the most difficult case in which creators
start with no standards of their own, i.e., Eii ¼ ;.
Making Evaluations Creator i’s evaluation of creation c from critic j’s perspective
is denoted by Eij(c). Though the notation is analogous, Eij is not simply the
application of Eij. This is because the applicability of Eij depends on c. For instance,
if the discipline is furniture design, creator i might know a great deal about how
j evaluates chairs, but nothing about how j evaluates tables. If c is a table, it would
makes more sense for i to rely on Ei than Eij when estimating j’s evaluation.
Wiggins writes ½½X to mean the translation of the knowledge in X (where X is R
or E) to a function from creations to real numbers in [0, 1]. We will extend this to
map to [0, 1] 9 [0, 1], for the result and the confidence in that result. Additionally,
we need a function that can aggregate different evaluations and confidence levels
into a single answer. Heuristics such as assuming that people from similar
backgrounds have similar opinions could compensate for missing information. Such
details don’t matter here, and so we’ll simply say that each creator has background
social knowledge, Si, and a function Fi that uses this knowledge to consolidate the
other information. Thus, for i = j we have:
2 Wiggins uses L to denote the language that this knowledge is expressed in. Such details do not matter
in the present treatment, and so no assumptions will be made about representation.
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EijðcÞ ¼ FiðSi; j; ½½EiðcÞ; ½½Ei1ðcÞ; . . .; ½½EiN ðcÞÞ
In the extreme case, a creator’s own opinion would only depend on knowledge in
Eii. However, by hypothesis Eii is initially empty, meaning that the creator must
construct its opinion from what it knows about others’ opinions. Though we could
make the system issue the most representative opinion, it will prove more
interesting if the system prefers to emulate some critics more than others, based on
its affinity for each critic. These affinity levels are stored in Ai, and are discussed in
the next section. We can now define an analogous function to Fi:
EiiðcÞ ¼ F0iðSi;Ai; ½½EiðcÞ; ½½Ei1ðcÞ; . . .; ½½EiN ðcÞÞ
Note that Eii would be just one component of the creator’s objective function during
search (cf. Jennings 2008), but is the only function creator i uses to evaluate its own
and others’ finished products.
Communication Creator i learns to make autonomous evaluations via interactions
with other critics. Suppose that a creator i has made a creation c, which is observed
by a critic j = i. There are three broad classes of information that can be
communicated.
Evaluation—A simple ‘‘like/dislike’’ judgment. Critic j communicates Ejj(c), and
then creator i adjusts its knowledge until EijðcÞ  EjjðcÞ.
Correction—Critic j creates c0, a modification of c that it likes better. Creator
i updates its knowledge so that Eij(c
0) [ Eij(c), and tries to determine what
changes between c and c0 increased j’s liking.
Criticism—Justifications for an evaluation or correction, e.g., what is pleasing or
what criteria were used. Critic j communicates knowledge in or derived from Ej
to creator i, which attempts to integrate this knowledge into Ei. If i cannot make
Eij(c) &Ejj(c), then i might ask j for clarification.
In each case, creator i adjusts Ei in order to reproduce j’s evaluation. Because
knowledge is represented at the most general level and duplication is avoided, this
adjustment should always result in change to Ei or to Eij. These processes cannot by
themselves make Eii non-empty.
In creative AI systems that only allow interaction with one critic (e.g., the
programmer), all of the system’s knowledge can be represented in Ei, meaning that
EiiðcÞ ¼ EijðcÞ ¼ EiðcÞ ¼ ½½EiðcÞ, i.e., the system parrots back its understanding of
the critic’s standards. The situation improves somewhat with multiple critics since
the system forms EiiðcÞ from many different sets of standards in ways dependent on
Si and Ai. However, it still only offers direct translations of other critics’ standards.
What’s more, in both cases, the system’s need to represent other creators’ standards
faithfully implies that its standards only change in reaction to and in proportion to
changes in other critics’ standards. Hence, though these processes support
autonomous evaluation and are non-random, they are not enough for creative
autonomy. The next section suggests some extensions that would add the missing
component, autonomous and non-random change.
494 K. E. Jennings
123
Changing Standards
If the system faithfully updates its knowledge of others’ standards, autonomous
change will not occur until there is knowledge in Eii, which is the only knowledge
that can evolve independently of other creators’ standards. Since all of the system’s
knowledge comes from other critics and is stored at the most general level, there is
as yet no reason for knowledge to enter Eii. Inspired by human psychological
processes that would be relatively simple to implement, this section suggests some
reasons that Eii might be initially populated and subsequently changed.
Additional Behaviors
As described so far, the system combines others’ preferences according to how
applicable the preferences are and how much the system ‘‘likes’’ each critic. This section
first describes how ‘‘liking’’ could initially be configured and then changed. Next, the
system is given reasons to doubt its own evaluations, which thus far it has never had
cause to do. This doubt will later be argued to lead to including knowledge in Eii.
Affinity Any number of rules could be used to set the initial affinities in Ai, all of
which have a basis in human psychology:
Propinquity—Our friendships (Nahemow and Lawton 1975) and collaborations
(Kraut et al. 1988) are largely determined by physical proximity. Analagously,
the system could initially be set to prefer creators who are nearby in some
topology.
Similarity—We subconsciously favor people with similar backgrounds. In a
society of artificial creators with varied parameterizations, similarly parameter-
ized creators might initially prefer each other.
Popularity—When we cannot make sense of a speaker’s message, we decide
whether to believe her based on cues about her prestige (Cialdini 2007), e.g., age
(time in the society) or popularity (received affinity).
Some affinity changes would be independent of the system’s evaluations:
Familiarity—Absent other discernable differences, we tend to prefer people and
things we have seen before (Zajonc 1968). Frequent interactions could increase
liking.
Mutual Affinity—We are more apt to like someone if they first show that they like
us (Mettee and Aronson 1974). The system could increase its affinity for critics
that evaluate the system’s creations positively.
Finally, affinity could adjust in response to the creator evaluating a critic’s work,
or by how closely the creator and critic agree on evaluations of a third creator’s
work.
Self-Confidence and Pride Unsure about the quality of their work, novices are
particularly sensitive to praise and criticism. The sting of failure can be offset by the
memory of success (Heine et al 2006), helping the novice maintain self-confidence.
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A person whose self-confidence is too low for too long is likely to give up and
pursue other interests.
A creative system could be written with a need to maintain a certain level of self-
confidence. While this need might seem like an unnecessary liability, it also
provides a rationale for many kinds of actions. In particular, a system might
maintain memories of proud accomplishments as a way to preserve self-confidence
in the face of failure.
Suppose that a system has a memory of past successes, Mi, and their last average
evaluation, Mi ¼
P
c2Mi EiiðcÞ=jMij. Only highly salient creations would be stored
(ones that elicited ‘‘pride’’), such as creations that got unexpectedly high evaluations
(relative to recent creations, other creators’ creations, or the critic’s typical
evaluation), particularly from a critic the creator likes. As with a person who
concludes that all of her prior work was worthless, there could be negative
repercussions for the system if the value of Mi suddenly dropped, particularly if
other sources of self-confidence (e.g., recent external approval) were also lacking.
As discussed next, avoiding this drop could lead the system to develop its own
standards.
Bootstrapping and Changing Eii
This section introduces three processes that could introduce and change knowledge
in Eii. As before, each is inspired by human behavior. The processes are sketched
here, and discussed relative to creative autonomy in the next section.
Cognitive Dissonance Consider a human novice whose evaluations mirror an
influential mentor’s, and whose self-confidence rests on memories of his past
successes. Suppose that one particular creation, which was highly rated by his
mentor, is a large source of pride. He only understands why that work was good in
terms of how he understands his mentor’s preferences, which he trusts since he
respects that mentor. Now suppose that the mentor strongly criticized a highly
similar creation, throwing into doubt his understanding of the mentor’s standards.
Or, perhaps an unrelated event would make him lose respect for the mentor, leading
him to discount the mentor’s opinion. In either case, he could no longer justify such
a high evaluation for his prized creation, leading to a dilemma: believe the reduced
evaluation, and hence that he’s not as good as he thought; or, doubt the new
evaluation, and continue to believe he and his work are great. This ‘‘cognitive
dissonance’’ (Festinger 1957) is distressing enough have physiological correlates
(Croyle and Cooper 1983), and can lead us to alter the truth or our memories in
order to allay it.
A system programmed to ‘‘feel proud’’ could face a similar situation. When a
creation enters Mi, the creator agrees with the critic’s evaluation, that is, Eii(c) &
Ejj(c), which, if Eii ¼ ;, was arrived at via other critics’ preferences. When
knowledge of these preferences or their weighting changes, some evaluations in Mi
could drop, as would Mi. By construction, the system cannot tolerate too large of a
drop. Since the system must also accurately represent others’ preferences, it cannot
496 K. E. Jennings
123
simply refuse to change that knowledge. To resolve this conflict, it could add
information to Eii that keeps Mi from dropping too much.
False Inferences About Preferences Criticism includes the reasons behind an
overall evaluation. However, the reasons we offer do not always reflect how we
make our decisions. For instance, people will say why they preferred one of many
products, all of which are actually identical (Wilson and Nisbett 1978). Similarly,
we invent reasons that sound good if our real reasons aren’t socially acceptable. For
instance, though our evaluations of one aspect of a person pollute our evaluations of
other aspects (the ’’halo effect’’; Thorndike 1920), we often don’t know or admit
this. Instead, we offer reasons that are demonstrably unrelated to our actual
evaluation process (Nisbett and Wilson 1977).
A creator whose standards are based solely on other people’s standards is
unlikely to say that she likes something ‘‘because he likes it too.’’ Instead, she will
search for distinguishing features of the item to form a plausible-sounding
explanation. Even if incomplete or incorrect, this utterance becomes part of how she
understands her preferences, and might even impact future evaluations. Additionally,
the very fact that she has have chosen something may motivate her to raise the
chosen alternative’s perceived superiority over similar alternatives (Brehm 1956).
Suppose that a creative AI had a language for communicating criticism.
Supposing that Ei consists of exemplars, neural networks, and other irregular
representations, there is a large chance that the language could not express complete
and correct information. If the rules it extrapolates are put into Eii, two things
happen. First, the inaccuracy of the rules will lead to evaluations that no longer
directly follow Ei n Eii. Second, the creator’s standards will lag behind changes in
Ei n Eii, since those will not be reflected in Eii. Thus, the system will begin to
develop divergent standards, albeit clumsily.
Selective Acceptance Seeking Even someone with a completely independent sense
of what he likes might want a style somewhat similar to people he admires. If one
such peer’s preferences shifted, he might adjust his own preferences in that
direction. However, there would likely be several other peers whom he wishes to be
somewhat near to, leading to experimentation until an equilibrium is reached. Other
strategies for maintaining distinctiveness while still feeling part of a group can also
be imagined (see, e.g., Hornsey and Jetten 2004).
Once a creative AI relies substantially on Eii, changes in other critics’ preferences
will have a smaller impact on Eii. However, the system might try to keep an
acceptably low discrepancy between Eii(c) and Eij(c), where j is a critic whom i has
a high affinity for. Indeed, this tuning might be what enables the system to deviate
from others’ standards but stay recognizably within the same domain or genre.
Autonomy Revisited
Creative autonomy requires autonomous evaluation, autonomous change, and non-
randomness. A system such as was described above could certainly be capable of
autonomous and non-random evaluation. Furthermore, none of the schemes
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described above makes random changes at random times (though admittedly the
described changes would be more accidental than deliberate). Therefore, it just
remains to be considered whether the system’s changes would be autonomous.
Castelfranchi (1995) says that a social agent has autonomy if it isn’t bound by other
agents’ goals for it. Similarly, the test for whether a system has creative autonomy is
whether an external agent could somehow cajole the system into adopting criteria
that the external agent chose for it.
In all three schemes described above, change happens in response to external
events. For cognitive dissonance and acceptance seeking, these events would be
changes in others’ standards (Ei n Eii), or in affinities (Ai), possibly only after the
effect of several separate changes had accumulated. For false inferences, the event
would be the request for a critique. Unless a critic could manipulate when the
creator starts and stops changing its standards, these change processes could be
autonomous.
With only a single critic (such as the system’s creator), such manipulation is
possible. Acceptance seeking would simply entail following the lone critic’s
changes in standards within a margin of error. The critic could take advantage of
false inferences by requesting criticisms as a way to perturb the creator’s standards,
only stopping when an acceptable result was reached. The critic could also give
extreme and inconsistent ratings to trigger changes via cognitive dissonance.
The situation changes with multiple critics. The complex web of relations
between Ai, Ei, Mi, and Mi would make it hard to predict whether an external
change would trigger adjustments to Eii. Multiple simultaneous changes might
cancel out, or several small changes across time could accumulate until one change
unleashes a string of compensatory adjustments. These features would make the
system less clearly responsive to any single critic, and in particular much more
difficult for any single critic to manipulate.
Autonomy also precludes making fixed transformations to others’ standards.
When knowledge is first put into Eii, it is derived with error from others’ standards,
such as the stereotyped rules delivering criticism would produce, or the extrema that
cognitive dissonance would enshrine. One could argue that these things would only
result in time-lagged caricatures of other critics’ preferences. The counter-argument
is that in a society where every creator pays attention to several other creators, such
distortions would serve as attractors, leading to unpredictable clusters of similar
styles, and unpredictable shifts in those styles. These emergent dynamics would
make it impossible to say which creator was leading the change, meaning at least
that no one creator was more autonomous than another.
The foregoing claim requires more theoretical and empirical work. However, in a
single-critic system, it is a fair guess that Eii would be more of a fun-house mirror
reflection of the critic than anything that could be considered autonomously arrived
at. Given that it would also be impossible to rule out that the critic had manipulated
the system’s dynamics until such time as the system arrived at standards that the
critic liked, it seems fair to say that single-critic systems, at least as sketched here,
would not achieve creative autonomy. The answer for multiple-critic systems will
have to wait.
498 K. E. Jennings
123
Conclusions
This paper introduced the concept of creative autonomy, which requires that a
system be able to evaluate its creations without consulting others, that it be able to
adjust how it makes these evaluations without being explicitly told when or how to
do so, and that these processes not be purely random. Extending work by Wiggins
(2006), a notation was developed to denote evaluations drawn from the integration
of knowledge about several different critics’ standards. Importantly, the system has
different affinities for each critic, which impact how it integrates their opinions to
form its own opinion. Initially the system has no independently-held preferences,
but this can change when the system attempts to justify its evaluations, or if the
system must maintain high evaluations for some of its past work in the face of other
critics’ changing standards.
Such a system was argued to be capable of autonomous, non-random evaluation,
and the change processes sketched are non-random. In a single critic society (i.e.,
one with the programmer and the software), it is unlikely that the system’s standards
would be more than distorted agglomerations of the critic’s standards. What’s more,
the ease with which the critic could manipulate the system would make it hard to
argue that the creator was changing autonomously. In a multiple-critic society,
complex interactions might make any one creator impervious to manipulation, and
emergent dynamics of the system could lead to clusters of creative styles. However,
these ideas await empirical demonstration. Additionally, the philosophical question
of whether changing absent direct manipulation is the same as autonomy must be
answered.
The description of creative autonomy offered here captures only a small part of
why humans can be considered creative. A system whose creations had a style that
was not easily traced to a few influences, yet was still recognizably in the same
domain, would be a major accomplishment. However, as just mentioned, freedom
from manipulation is not the same as acting purposefully. The system described
here only makes changes in (possibly indirect) reaction to others’ changes. Human
creators, in contrast, proactively change their standards. It is conceivable that this
system could make proactive changes by looking for patterns in how others’
standards change with time and in relation to each other, which would be proactive,
though perhaps not purposeful enough to be considered creative.
Though this work does not directly address the distinction between exploratory
and transformational creativity, it could lead to interesting insights in that area. In
particular, transforming a search space can be seen as searching over search spaces.
In addition to making transformational creativity a form of exploratory creativity,
there remains the question of what objective function is used to guide the search
over transformations. Repeating this question over recursive searches of transform
spaces of transform spaces of transform spaces, etc., one must ask what the base
case is, i.e., what is the ultimate objective function? The perspective suggested here
(and doubtless elsewhere, too) is that the ultimate objective function emerges out of
the interactions between creators. It thus becomes essential for any system to be able
to interact fully with its creative milieu if it is to be truly creative.
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Creative artificial intelligence must always fight the impression that it is simply a
fancy tool for expressing the programmer’s creativity. This burden can lead to a
desire to isolate the system from outside influences as much as possible. However,
as argued here, autonomy might require more, not less, interaction, though this
interaction must extend beyond the programmer. Though the hypotheses presented
here are painted with a broad brush and await verification, this work does suggest
that creative AI must be viewed in a broader context than it traditionally has.
Developing creative AI might still amount to solving an information processing
problem, but a good part of this information comes from the social world. Of course,
this is true of our own creative processes, as well.
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